

# **Brian Kemp:**

## **Like his Democratic Predecessors, Suppressing Ballot Integrity and the Legitimacy of Georgia's Elections**

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# Executive Summary

**Cronyism** is defined as:

- “the practice of favoring one's close friends...” Dictionary.com<sup>a</sup>
- “partiality towards friends and associates” Markkula Center For Applied Ethics<sup>b</sup>
- “the substitution of political influence for free markets” Economist David R. Henderson<sup>c</sup>

This report documents the links and cooperation between the power brokers of Georgia's Democratic and Republican parties in purchasing and retaining a computerized voting system wholly vulnerable to insider and outsider manipulation of vote totals. The cronyism reported here in this account probably isn't exceptional for Georgia, except for the two-party synergetic subversion of the core values of our democratic republic, the right to have our votes accurately recorded and counted.

News outlets discussing Secretary of State Brian Kemp's gubernatorial candidacy haven't covered Kemp's relationships with lobbyists and Democratic power brokers. Exposing these relationships makes clear that Kemp's record running the Elections Division follows the path of his Democratic predecessors, who ignored scientific facts and voter objections to reward favored vendors. Former Democratic officials including ex-Gov. Roy Barnes, former Secretaries of State Lewis Massey and Cathy Cox are exposed as participants in a web of relationships with Kemp, where top officials side with voting machine companies and against their constituents to keep elections vulnerable.

Kemp expended Georgia tax dollars hiring Gov. Barnes as his attorney to defend Georgia's vulnerable, and un-defendable voting system. Barnes' shameless hyperbola in federal court failed to distract Judge Totenberg, who states “***the Defendants [Kemp et al] and State election officials had buried their heads in the sand...*** [on computerized voting vulnerabilities]”.

This report reviews auditable voting equipment standards, because Kemp and the legislature have failed to enact any meaningful standards. It examines the voting equipment Kemp is ready to buy, to reward lobbyists like Kemp's fraternity brother Lewis Massey. We expose the marketing schemes lobbyists like Massey are deploying to expend \$120 million of Georgia tax dollars to buy new, hacker-friendly voting equipment.

This report closes with a plea asking citizens to vote, and to demand meaningful standards for voting equipment, standards recognized by the nation's leading computer security and elections experts. Georgia should have voting system standards mandating equipment that use human-marked, human readable paper ballots that are scanned by in-precinct paper ballot scanners on election night, with election night audits.

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<sup>a</sup> Accessed 11/01/18. <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/cronyism>

<sup>b</sup> Judy Nadler & Miriam Schulman, accessed 11/01/18. Markkula Center For Applied Ethics <https://www.scu.edu/government-ethics/resources/what-is-government-ethics/favoritism-cronyism-and-nepotism/>

<sup>c</sup> David R. Henderson, The Economics and History of Cronyism 7/27/2012 [https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Henderson\\_cronyism\\_1.1%20final.pdf](https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Henderson_cronyism_1.1%20final.pdf)

## **Introduction:** *Understanding the players*

Most voters who dislike Abrams and the Democrats, or Kemp and the Republicans, or even those who have no feelings toward either party, are likely unaware of how both parties have been involved in undermining Georgia's election process. This report will review some recent and historical evidence which shows that Kemp, like his bi-partisan predecessors, used Georgia tax dollars during his 8 years in office to justify and defend Georgia's insecure voting system in the face of a growing body of scientific reports demonstrating how our election system is at risk from hacking and errors <sup>1,2,3,4,5</sup>

This story begins by examining the role of former Democratic Secretary of State Lewis Massey.

**Lewis Massey**, son of a lobbyist, attended UGA in the 1980's and pledged into fraternity Lambda Chi Alpha. At the fraternity, Massey served as initiation adviser to Brian Kemp, making Kemp a fraternity brother<sup>6</sup>. Massey was appointed to serve as Secretary of State in 1996 by then Governor Zell Miller and subsequently won an election and served as Secretary of State until 1999. In '96 Massey hired Cathy Cox to serve as Assistant Secretary of State supervising the Elections Division, a position which greatly raised her political profile. In '98 Massey ran for Governor but lost in the Democratic primary to Roy Barnes. The same month Massey lost the Democratic primary, Massey registered as lobbyist for Global Election Management Systems (GEMS), a company later acquired by Diebold and renamed Diebold Election Systems, which manufactures, programs and sells electronic voting equipment.

**Cathy Cox** ran as a Democrat for Secretary of State in '98 and won, taking office in Jan. '99. Lewis Massey, now the lobbyist for GEMS, was in a great position to lobby his ex-employee, Cathy Cox, to sell her computerized voting equipment. The 2000 Florida Election debacle, with the failure<sup>7</sup> of paper punch cards in the 2000 Palm Beach County election, provided an opportunity for the voting machine vendors to use the debacle as a new marketing ploy to up-sell their clients, such as Secretary of State Cox, expensive computerized touch-screen voting machines. The voting machine vendors employed another marketing scheme, to use the 2000 Florida Election debacle<sup>8,9</sup>, to inappropriately mis-characterize<sup>10</sup> all paper-based voting systems, such as paper ballots that were scanned and tabulated on inexpensive computerized optical scanners, with the failed punch cards. The marketing efforts of the voting machine companies were very effective not only at the state and local level, but with Congress, which passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, which provided over \$1.6 billion<sup>11</sup> in funding for the states for updating voting equipment, through 2007.

In response to the Florida 2000 debacle, Secretary Cox supported setting up the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Voting Commission, and the Commission specified that voting equipment should produce a voter verified audit trail, which computer science professionals insisted must require paper ballots. The Georgia Legislature in 2001 responded by passing a bill to permit computerized voting with a paper trail. However, that would prevent Lewis Massey's client, GEMS / Diebold, from closing the deal, as their touch-screen computers had no paper trail.

Thus in 2002, **Gov. Roy Barnes** worked with Cox to pressure Georgia legislators to cave-in to GEMS/Diebold and accept the equipment with no paper trail. Legislators in powerful positions caved

to extreme pressure from Gov. Barnes' lobbyists<sup>12</sup>, and passed a bill to get rid of the paper trail mandate. This enabled Massey to enrich himself<sup>13</sup>, and left Georgia with \$160 million in Diebold contracts, voting equipment that was vulnerable to insider and outsider manipulation, and a system which is impossible to audit or use to conduct meaningful recounts. The computerized voting system was deployed in November 2002 with massive technical failures that went undisclosed by Cox's office<sup>14</sup>, and questionable election results<sup>15</sup> were certified. While some technical issues were addressed, others have been persistent, such as hardware and system design failures, most notably the failure to produce a voter-verified paper ballot. The design failures, hardware and software have remained security threats continued during Cox's administration<sup>16</sup>, Karen Handel's<sup>17</sup> and Brian Kemp's administration<sup>18 19</sup> to this day.

### **When did Georgians begin to oppose computerized voting?**

Although opposition by citizens groups and computer professionals began prior to the 2002 implementation of the un-auditable computerized systems, concerted and organized efforts to bring accountability back to Georgia's election systems began in early 2004<sup>20</sup>. Computer professionals like Garland Favorito of VoterGA, together with Georgians for Verified Voting, the multi-partisan Voter Choice Coalition, Defenders of Democracy and concerned voters from all parties, began working with GOP State Senator Tom Price to pass SB500<sup>21</sup>, a bill which would have required a paper record for every vote cast. Sen. Price asked the author of this paper to testify before the State and Local Government Operations Committee (SLOGO), where Secretary Cathy Cox's Director of Elections, Kathy Rogers, stated before the committee that it was "impossible" to attach a printer to the existing machines. I disproved the statement with a photograph of the inside of Georgia's existing Diebold voting machine, which already contained a built-in printer inside each machine. Roger's being caught in her misleading testimony helped convince the committee on the need for paper records for each vote cast. SB 500 then passed out of committee, passed the Senate that year, but the bill was never heard in the State House and thus did not become law.

### **When did Brian Kemp and other Secretaries of State learn about the security issues with computerized voting?**

During the 2004 legislative session, then State Senator Kemp would have had the opportunity to discuss SB 500 with his colleagues and vote on that bill. After the legislative session ended, the author of this report began attending Georgia State Election Board meetings. The State Election Board conducts what are essentially preliminary hearings into election law violations, "fraud and irregularities"<sup>22</sup>. Defenders of Democracy built a video archive of these proceedings starting in 2004. Defenders of Democracy and allied election integrity activists began using the public comment section of these public meetings to hand-deliver computerized voting security reports and other crucial documents to the Secretary of State and State Election Board members, creating a public record that they had been informed of voting security issues. Despite these documents being officially entered into the public record, no actions were taken by Secretaries Cox, Handel or Kemp to solve the critical problems identified.

One relevant document accepted into the record by Cox, Handel & Kemp was the conviction record of an embezzler named Jeffrey W. Dean. Dean was convicted of 23 counts of embezzlement totaling \$385,000<sup>23</sup>, did time, but then wrote election software for Global Election Management Systems (GEMS), the company that became Diebold Election Systems<sup>24</sup>. Dean was a senior technical officer

for GEMS when they were acquired. No action was taken by Kemp, Handel, or Cox based on the fact their our elections software was written by a convicted embezzler, despite these conviction papers being placed into the public record of the State Election Board.

Another document hand-delivered to the Secretary of State and State Election Board was a 2006 report, Princeton University's *Security Analysis of the Diebold Accuvote-TS Voting Machine*<sup>25</sup>, a report specific to the exact model of voting machine used statewide in Georgia. That report was co-authored by Alex Halderman, who has subsequently become a Professor of Computer Science & Engineering at University of Michigan. In the 2006 report Halderman and colleagues found over 20 computer security vulnerabilities specific to the Accuvote-TS used in Georgia. This report was delivered both during Secretary Karen Handel's and Secretary Brian Kemp's administrations. Neither Kemp nor his predecessors publicly acknowledged the security risks identified in this and subsequent reports. Kemp has nonetheless made a series of broad and unsupportable claims through 2018 that our elections are secure<sup>26 27 28 29</sup>.

### **What has Kemp done lately regarding computerized election vulnerabilities?**

As Secretary of State in 2010, Kemp had taken a “public” position to correct election insecurity. Per Voter GA, “Kemp... said that he would ‘lead the charge’ to replace our voting systems at the 2010 Georgia Christian Alliance debate.”<sup>30</sup> Eight years later, we have the same voting hardware. Clearly, no charge was led.

More recently, Kemp has attempted to distract the public regarding his record of obfuscation, mismanagement, and expenditure of Georgia tax dollars in defense of vulnerable elections. On 9/12/18, a trial into the ongoing election vulnerability crisis maintained by Kemp's inaction was brought before Federal Court Judge Amy Totenberg. The plaintiffs, Curling et al, wanted an injunction from Judge Totenberg to order Kemp to conduct the November 6 general election on paper ballots that could be scanned, audited and recounted. The intent of the requested injunction was to protect Georgia voters from a number of attack vectors documented in the evidentiary record<sup>31</sup>, and prevent the election manipulation possible on computerized voting machines.

On the day of the hearing before Judge Totenberg, Kemp and Attorney General Chris Carr held a campaign event “Declaring gang violence a public safety ‘crisis’”<sup>32</sup>. Even so, several reporters were in Federal Court that day to see the Curling v. Kemp trial. Ironically, Attorney General Chris Carr had chosen to not defend Brian Kemp in this election security case, because of a conflict of interest, but had no qualms appearing at the news media event with Kemp that same day.

### **So who was defending Kemp in *Kemp v. Curling*?**

Kemp expended Georgia tax dollars to hire former Democratic Governor Roy Barnes as his defense attorney, the same Governor, who 16 years earlier, had lobbyists pressure legislators to remove requirements for paper records for every vote cast.



Brian Kemp between presentations at SAFE Commission, 8/30/18.

### What happened in court?

Prof. Alex Halderman, Professor of Computer Science & Engineering at University of Michigan, - demonstrated the hacking of an election on a Georgia voting machine model, Diebold's Accuvote-TSX, for Judge Totenberg and the court, as he has done previously before Congress and a variety of news outlets. Halderman then testified to the vulnerabilities of Georgia's voting system during questioning by the plaintiff's attorneys and when cross-examined by former Democratic Governor Roy Barnes. During Halderman's testimony, Barnes attempted to use Southern-fried localisms to discredit Halderman in court, making the ridiculous statement **in federal court before Judge Totenberg:**

*"Michigan, where the sun rises in the West"*<sup>33</sup>,

essentially ridiculing all Georgians as fools who can't use science to make decisions, in an attempt to smear Halderman's testimony as inadmissible in a Federal Court in Georgia. But the theatrics didn't stop there, **Barnes continued his grandstanding** by asking a computer and elections security expert,

*"Do you know where the Big Chicken is?"*<sup>34</sup>

## What was Judge Totenberg's conclusion on the role of Kemp and State Election officials on the security of Georgia's voting machines?

Judge Totenberg concluded *“The State’s posture in this litigation... indicated that **the Defendants [Kemp et al] and State election officials had buried their heads in the sand...** in their dealing with the ramifications of ...a host of serious security vulnerabilities permitted by their outdated [Elections] software and system operations”*<sup>35</sup>.

**Extrapolating from Judge Totenberg's order and the evidence she heard in formulating her decisions, the election security vulnerabilities may allow elections insiders such as Kemp and state elections officials, and essentially anyone who gains access to the election system, whether U.S. citizens or foreign operatives, the opportunity to rig the election results.**

Thus, Kemp has failed completely in his duties as Secretary of State.

If Kemp was merely misled by his lobbyist buddies and subordinates, he is unfit to hold any elected office, however his 2010 testimony to the 2010 Georgia Christian Alliance debate indicates knowledge of computerized voting's vulnerabilities.

For a fascinating summary of other crucial details in the Curling v. Kemp case hearing, read journalist Timothy Pratt's 11/03/18 article titled [“Cybersecurity Battle On Hold In Georgia As Election Nears”](#).

## Are Kemp's critics exaggerating the threat Kemp poses to the November 6<sup>th</sup> election?

Kemp's spokesperson Candace Broce has deflected concerns of Kemp's critics. In a recent AJC article titled *“Can Georgia’s electronic voting machines be trusted?”*<sup>36</sup>, Broce stated:

*“Further fueling distrust of Georgia elections”, ...Kemp's critics... “say Kemp shouldn’t be in charge of elections as secretary of state while also running for governor.*

*Kemp has said he won’t resign, and **there’s no way for him to manipulate elections**, which are managed locally by Georgia’s 159 county election offices.*

To deconstruct the assertions made by Kemp set off in in bold text, above:

- Kemp's office creates the elections database and computer programs co-mingled with data known as the “Ballot Definition Files” which determine who is on the ballot, how the ballot is formatted, and ultimately, how the votes are tabulated on each of Georgia's 27,000 voting machines.
- Scientific papers dating back to 2003<sup>37</sup> show how vote-rigging software can be inserted into our voting machine's memory cards, and the ideal opportunity is during the creation of the elections database<sup>38</sup> and Ballot Definition Files.
- Besides the voting machine vendor<sup>39</sup>, the Secretary of State's office has the greatest leverage and opportunity to rig our elections as the office which creates the database and Ballot Definition Files. Their office can create a statewide rig of our votes before a single vote is cast, without any hands-on tampering on election night.

- The database and Ballot Definition Files, rigged or not, are distributed by the secretary of state's office to the counties. The county elections office creates memory cards for each voting machine, which additionally provides county-level staff & contractors an opportunity to further pre-rig voting machine memory cards with a time-triggered rigging or false tabulation on election night without hands-on tampering.

Kemp's spokesperson Broce made incredible assertions <sup>40</sup>:

*"The secretary of state does not actually run elections in Georgia," Broce said. "We do not tabulate votes".*

The above statements are irrelevant, when you understand the Secretary's Office is best positioned to send a rigged elections database and Ballot Definition Files to the counties, where the votes can be tabulated as specified in pre-election rigging.

### **Is it a positive development that Kemp has been saying we need to replace our aging voting machines?**

Georgia does need to replace its 16 year old Diebold computerized voting equipment, so money needs to be spent, somewhere around 30 million for easily-audited paper ballot scanners. If Kemp had an interest in applying universal election standards to Georgia, standards used by 70% of voters nationwide<sup>41</sup>, Kemp would only be considering voting equipment that uses human-marked, human readable paper ballots that are scanned by in-precinct paper ballot scanners on election night. On 11/30/17, Verified Voting's Susan Greenhalgh advocated for best practices for voting systems<sup>42</sup>, before Georgia's SciTech Committee<sup>43</sup>, yet Kemp has shown no interest in applying meaningful standards to the purchasing process<sup>44</sup>.

The problem is that lobbyists associated with Kemp, Lewis Massey and former elections director Kathy Rogers, want Georgians to spend four times that – on the order of \$120 MILLION, minimum, in tax dollars for the most expensive statewide voting system in the United States. The marketing scheme deployed by the voting equipment vendors is to sell expensive voting computers called Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) that function, at best, as pens and pencils, and at worst, as ballot rigging devices.

### **What are Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs), and do we need any of these BMD computers?**

BMDs vary in functionality and purpose, the best designed BMDs take a standard sized, absentee-type or in-precinct paper ballot, and fill-in circles next to the candidate or initiative to assist voters. BMDs are appropriate for some voters with visual or other challenges, and clean elections advocates want one BMD per precinct statewide, to provide for those voters.

### **But some vendors are selling BMDs with a multitude of built-in problems:**

**Election Security Vulnerabilities** - BMDs can print your ballot selection in plain text, and have a bar code or other code printed on the ballot for a different selection, and voters will never be the wiser. The falsified or erroneous bar code can be read by the ballot scanner during tabulation or a recount. Thus if you rig the BMDs, you rig the election. BMDs can be hacked by elections insiders or outsiders, same as our current Diebold Computers. An investment in BMDs would only serve to trade old




security vulnerabilities for new ones.

**Financial** – Kemp is entertaining buying BMDs from our lobbyists as a one-to-one replacement for each Diebold voting computer now in use in Georgia, thus 27,000 BMDs with a cost of \$120 million.

**Violation of the KISS principle** – For most voters, these BMDs just replace a pen. BMDs also need to be programmed and tested in the same manner as Diebold Touch-Screen Computers, and add enormous unnecessary complexity to our elections process.

**Voting Wait Times** – Most voters can use pens on paper ballots much faster than voting on BMDs or touchscreens, BMDs slow down in-precinct voting by about the same amount of time as the Diebold Touch-Screens, which already is unacceptably long.

### Kemp's Lobbyist “Friends”



Longtime observers of the Secretary’s office have raised concerns that ES & S, a major election equipment manufacturer, appears to have been pre-chosen as Kemp's designated vendor. Kemp conducted a pilot project testing only ES &S's ExpressVote Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) in Rockdale County in 2017. No other vendors equipment was tested, nor were models of ES & S voting equipment designed for in-precinct ballot scanning of hand-marked paper ballots. And who represents ES & S...

**De-facto Lobbyist Kathy Rogers** was formerly Secretary of State Cathy Cox's Director of Elections.

While working under Secretary Cox, she was advocating for Diebold while on the taxpayer's payroll. After her service under Cox, she went straight to working as a Diebold lobbyist, to her current role at ES & S with the title of Vice President of Government Relations. The connections between Rogers, ES & S and Kemp's office are also a grave concern, as ES & S has been maintaining Georgia's old equipment throughout Kemp's 8 years in office, and has helped Kemp deflect security concerns the entire time, despite massive problems. Kemp has won two elections on these un-auditable systems while under ES & S's maintenance. Rogers appeared to be working as a lobbyist shepherding ES & S equipment around legislators<sup>45</sup> since at least 2017, but was not registered as a lobbyist with the state ethics commission for 2017 or 2018<sup>46</sup>.

**Lobbyist Lewis Massey**, Kemp's former frat brother, is still a lobbyist for voting machine companies as well as an array of other Georgia businesses, and admits to advising Kemp<sup>47</sup>. Massey now lobbies for Adkins Election Services / Unisyn, but he may also get a cut from other vendors as well.

Because of Kemp's ties to these lobbyists, many election integrity activists in Georgia are concerned that facts, science, or best practices derived from national and international experience will not prevail over these personal relationships in deciding which new voting system to purchase.

### **Family Ties bests conservatism and democracy.**

Senate Majority Leader Bill Cowser<sup>d</sup>, SD 46, having served<sup>48</sup> as majority leader, is in a position to deliver legislation funding the purchase of BMDs regardless of any factual concerns. He was advised by election integrity activists, including the author of this report, regarding concerns about 2018's Senate Bill 403 early in the legislative session. Senator Cowser was advised that the \$150 million dollar purchase authorized by his legislation would serve to substitute new vulnerabilities for the 16 year-old Diebold computers in use today. Senate Bill 403's acquisition of BMDs would provide a technological smoke screen to falsely reassure voters that the security vulnerabilities of computerized voting machines have been resolved.

Defenders of Democracy asked Cowser to help strengthen the bill to avoid wasting tax dollars on voting equipment that would leave our elections still vulnerable to hacking. Cowser disingenuously responded, "the leadership is backing that bill", without revealing that his brother-in-law is Brian Kemp<sup>49</sup>. Cowser responded "that is up to you" and walked away.

### **What is Kemp's SAFE Commission?**

#### **The SAFE Commission Creates a Fig Leaf for a Cronyist Voting Equipment Purchase.**

In April 2018, Secretary Kemp has appointed himself chair of the Secure, Accessible & Fair Elections (SAFE) Commission. The SAFE commission is evaluating replacement voting equipment, **without** having first adopted meaningful standards (see <https://www.verifiedvoting.org/voting-system-principles/>) for that equipment. The SAFE commission has 18 members, but only one has a computer security background, Dr. Wenke Lee, (Co-Executive Director, Georgia Tech's Institute for Information Security & Privacy) thus science and security concerns can be outvoted, as Dr. Lee is not referenced as having veto power.

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<sup>d</sup> Full Disclosure: The author of this report, John Fortuin was the Georgia Green Party nominee for State Senate District 46, and ran as a write-in candidate, against Bill Cowser. He has focused his campaign on exposing the cronyist corruption keeping our elections vulnerable to rigging and errors.

Had the Secretary taken the issue of election security seriously, he could have appointed to the commission, a majority of members who have qualifications in two categories:

- Computer security and science experts who are ready to serve with Dr. Wenke Lee.
- The plaintiffs who sued the Secretary's office over its security shortcomings.

The commission has held two meetings already, the second meeting on 8/30/18 had vendors showcasing their products, and the aforementioned lobbyists were in attendance, with Kathy Rogers introducing her subordinates<sup>50</sup>.

## **In Summary**

The relationships documented in this report suggest that cronyism, rather than the integrity of Georgia elections, are driving policy choices and decisions related to the expenditure of millions of tax payer dollars. This probably isn't exceptional for Georgia. What is exceptional is the two-party synergetic subversion of the core values of our democratic republic.

Core rights of Georgia voters are being violated:

- Our right to vote securely and to have our ballots audited in the precinct, and to have secure election tabulation.
- Our right to avoid election subversion by both election insiders, hackers, and foreign powers.

In spite of this account of cronyism and election subversion, this report urges each and every voter to:

1. **Vote in every election**, by absentee ballot (to ensure a paper record suitable for meaningful recounts , otherwise in-precinct).
2. **Demand that the Secretary of State's Office and Secretary Kemp's SAFE commission, implement Verified Voting's *Principles for New Voting Systems*<sup>51</sup>**. Conduct elections using hand-marked paper ballots read by digital scanners in each precinct on election night, and audited election night in the precinct by human poll workers.
3. **Demand the SAFE Commission give Dr. Wenke Lee veto power over equipment selection** to supervise implementation of *Principles for New Voting Systems*<sup>52</sup>.

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- <sup>2</sup> Roger Johnston, 11/05/2012. *How I Hacked An Electronic Voting Machine*. <https://www.popsci.com/gadgets/article/2012-11/how-i-hacked-electronic-voting-machine>
- <sup>3</sup> National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2018. *Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. <https://doi.org/10.17226/25120>.
- <sup>4</sup> Debra Bowen, 8/06/2007. *California Decertifies Voting Machines, Conditions Applied for Use* <http://www.govtech.com/security/California-Decertifies-Voting-Machines-Conditions-Applied.html>
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- <sup>6</sup> Jennifer Brett, 10/12/2018. 'Solid': Republican Brian Kemp plays up rural roots, business bonafides. [https://www.ajc.com/news/solid-republican-brian-kemp-plays-rural-roots-business-bonafides/OTAHo7LgnwgnnwKQG2CyFI/amp.html?\\_twitter\\_impression=true](https://www.ajc.com/news/solid-republican-brian-kemp-plays-rural-roots-business-bonafides/OTAHo7LgnwgnnwKQG2CyFI/amp.html?_twitter_impression=true)
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- <sup>11</sup> U.S. Elections Assistance Commission, 2008. Annual Report on Grant Programs, <https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/158.PDF>
- <sup>12</sup> John Fortuin, personal communication with Georgia legislators, 2004-2007, anonymity of legislators requested & respected.
- <sup>13</sup> John Fortuin, personal communication with Lewis Massey, approx. 2005.
- <sup>14</sup> Letter to Robert Urosevich from Robert Ray, Jr. dated 12-3-02 re: Rough Draft Punch List with attachment, [http://www.gaverifiedvoting.org/pdf/vi-gavv-ga-research-documents-reports/2002-ray\\_urosevich.pdf](http://www.gaverifiedvoting.org/pdf/vi-gavv-ga-research-documents-reports/2002-ray_urosevich.pdf)
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- <sup>16</sup> Deposition Of Britain J. Williams, III, 7/31/2007. Access database discussion, Pages 61-65 Favorito v. Cox CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2006CV119719 <https://voterga.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/britain-wiliams-deposition-admissions.pdf>
- <sup>17</sup> Deposition Of Britain J. Williams, III, 7/31/2007. Access database discussion, Pages 61-65 Favorito v. Cox CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2006CV119719 <https://voterga.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/britain-wiliams-deposition-admissions.pdf>
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- <sup>23</sup> BlackBoxVoting.org, 2004. Jeffrey\_Dean\_BlackBoxVoting.pdf Link expired, pdf available.
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